Public sector management issues in structural adjustment lending by Nunberg, Barbara
Policy, Research,  and Extemal  Affairs
WORKING  PAPERS
Public  Sector Management  l
and Private  Sector Development
Country  Economics  Department





in Structural  Adjustment
Lending
Barbara  Nunberg
Public sector management components of structural adjustment
loans (SALs) progressed unevenly, and the outcomes varied
with different political, administrative and economic condi-
tions. Change was often incremental and som.etimes  unsustain-
able.  Reforms linked to specific, actionable steps were more
successfully implemented.
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This paper reviews the Bank's experience in  constraints must be weighed against the catalytic
implementing public sector management re-  benefits SALs offer to sr:ir action on institu-
forms through structural adjustment lending.  tional measures, however.
The study focuses on those institutional aspects
of adjustment that deal specifically with "macro-  *  Public management reforms through SALs
management" issues related to improvements in  are more successful when supported by specific
the management performance of core central  technical assistance projects.  Otherwise, re-
government institutions and to systemic changes  forms may be one-shot events or may be subject
in public administrations. The paper reaches the  to slippage or reversal.  This is recommended
following broad conclusions:  despite the poor performance record o, lnuch of
the technical assistance provided for institutional
P  Public sector management components of  reforms in conjunction with SALs.
SALs progressed unevenly and outcomes varied
with diverse political, administrative and eco-  *  The haste of SAL schedules and the lack of
nomic conditions.  Accordingly, no uniform  dynamism and focus of traditional technical
solutions to institutional problems were pre-  assistance argues for the creation of a new
scribed by SALs.  Depending on circumstances,  lending instrument for public sector manage-
SALs sometimes fostered the creation of new in-  ment reform which would adopt a longer time
stitutions (often at the cost of promoting institu-  horizon to ensure adequate implementation, but
tional proliferation) or the reorganization or  would contain conditionality specifically fo-
even the elimination of old ones.  Institutional  cused on institutional reforms to ensure action.
change was often incremental and sometimes
unsustainable when Bank support was with-  *  P-eparatory country economic and sector
drawn.  work is crucial to successful public sector man-
agement reforms undertaken through SALs.
* Public sector management reforms for  Suc},  analysis should become a routine task in
which routinized methodologies and systems  the design of any institutional reform program in
were introduced and those that could be linked  the context of structural adjustment lending.
to actionable steps were more likely to be
sustained over time.  *  Monitoring and supervision of institutional
components of SALs needs to be systematized
* Short time horizons of SALs posed severe  and the quality of documentation improved.
constraints on the effective implementation of  Performance indicators need to be developed to
public sector management reforms. These  measure and/or evaluate progress.
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The  purpose  of this  paper  is  to provide  an overview  of public  sector
management  reforms  in  structural  adjustment  lending  and  to assess  the  Bank's
experience  in implementing  them. The  review  focuses  on those  institutional
aspects  of adjustment  that  deal  specifically  with macro-management*  issues
related  to improvements  in  the  management  performance  of core  central
government  institutions  and  to systemic  changes  in  public  adpUnistration.  The
paper  covers  public  sector  management  reforms  in 59 Structural  Adjustment
Loans  and  43 companion  Technical  Assistance  Loans  between  1979,  when
adjustment  lending  began,  and  June  1988.
Although  public  sector  management  reforms  were a  part  of Bank  lending
prior  to structural  adjustment,  most  earlier  institutional  interventions  were
through  sector-specific,  project-related  lending. The implementation
requirements  of the  adjustment  process  highlighted  the  need to  enhance  the
capacity  of core  government  economic  policy  making  institutions  to formulate
and  execute  macroeconomic  recovery  programs. Public  sector  management  reforms
in  SALs,  therefore,  have  been  focused  and  targeted  on a few  institutions  that
are  key to the  adjustment  process. These  iastitutional  reforms  have  been
attempted  in  relatively  short  time  horizons,  although  they  have sometimes  been
sequenced  over  serial  SALs,  and  with the  support  of companion  technical
assistance  loans.
The following  are  the  principal  areas  of public  sector  management
reformt  1) institutional  changes  required  for  m4cropconomic  and  financial
management  (present  in  all  59 SALs);  2)  non-financial  sectoral  institutional
reform  (found  in  56);  3) trade  policy  and  administration  reforms  (present  in
50);  and, 4) public administration reforms (present  in 31 SALs).
In  the  area  of economic.  and  financial  management,  most  SALs  emphasized
improvements  in  the  public  investment  programming  process. Often  this
involved  strengthening  the  coordination  of investment  decision  making  among
government  entities,  improvements  in the  institutional  and  procedural
mechanisms  for  planning  and investment,  and strengthening  of investment
monitoring. Efforts  to improve  economic  and  financial  management  also
involved  the  creation  or reinforcement  of economic  policy  bodies. These  were
often  linked  to immediate  demands  of SALs,  but  occasionally.became
institutionalized  as a technocratic  cadre  able  to engage  in  policy  dialogue
with  Bank  SAL  teams. Institutional  support  'for  debt  management  reform  was
also  provided  in  SALs. Most reforms  established  or reinforced  institutions  to
monitor  and  control  debt  and  tried  to  develop  systems  to feed  pertinent
information  on  debt  into  budgeting  and  public  investment  programs. Tax
administration  reform  was  another  aspect  of econowic  and financial  management
stressed  by SALs.  In general,  tax  administration  improvements  involved  the
streamlining  of customs  administration  procedures,  revision  of tax  codes,  and
the  improvement  of tax  collection  systems.
Institutional  measures  in.most  SALs  went beyond  the  core  economic  and
financial  institutions  to support  sectoral  restructuring  and  policy  reforms  as
well.  Sectoral  institutional  reforms  have  emphasized:  1) institutional
support  fo:;  policy  changes  involving  the  liberalization  of price  and  incentive
structures.;  2) improving  capacity  for  strategic  planning  in sectoral  organs;1'  - ii-
and,  3) reorganization  of sectoral  institutions.  Sectoral  lnstitutional
components  have  been  heavily  concentrated  in agriculture  and industry. Energy
was the  third  most prominent  sector  followed  by  health  and social  security,
transportation,  population,  water  and  urban  development,  and  housing.
Institutional  support  for  trade  policy  reforms  also  figured  prominently
in  structural  adjustment  lending.  Many  reforms  sought  to  streamline  -
institutions  or procedural  arrangements  for  trade  administration  and to revise
regulatory  codes  to  promote  liberalization.
Although  non-financial  sectoral  reforms  constituted  an important  aspect
of  many SAL  programs,  Bank staff  were increasingly  inclined  to deal  with these
issues  through  Sectoral  Adjustment  Lending. SALs  were the  preferred
instrument  only  if:  the  sectoral  issues  were important  enough  to the  overall
economy  to  justify  a centralized  SAL  operation;  administrative  efficiencies
could  be  gained  by  a  centralized  SAL effort  and sectoral  reforms  could  be
linked  to  more central  structural  reforms  without  fear  of the  whole  package
being  sabotaged  due  to lack  of political  commitment  on one  or another  single
item;  or, structural  adjustment  could  be used  as a  means  to provide
reinforcing  cross-conditionality  on sectoral  reform  issues.
Increasingly,  public  administration  reforms  have  become  prominent
institutional  components  of structural  adjustment  lending. These  components
generally  comprise  civil  service  management  and/or  reorganization  reforms,
mostly  emphasizing  structural  changes  in central  government  employment,  pay
and incentive  systems. These  reforms  sought  to  correct  excessive  public  wage
bills,  surplus  numbers  of civil  servants,  wage  compression  and  overall  salary
erosion. WhiWe  SALs  often  leveraged  one  shot  policy  reforms  such  as
employment  reduction.  TALs  provided  instittutional  support  for  longer  term
civil  service  management  improvements.
The following  trends  could  be detected  from  the  paper's  findings:
o  In  a few  instances,  improvements  in  public  investment  programing
institutions  and  procedures  may  have led  to or set  the  stage  for
budgetary  reform.
o  New institutional  mechanisms  for  dealing  with debt  management  have
been  established  in some  countries;  improvements  in coordination
between  ministries  and  central  banks  and  other  financial
authorities  may  have resulted.
O  A good  number  of economic  policy  institutions,  responsible  for
developing  coordinating  and  reviewing  macroeconomic  management  in
general,  and  adjustment  operations  in  particular,  have  been
established,  with  varying  impact.
O  New  agenqies  have arisen  to  deal  with trade  regime  reforms. There
has  been  simplification  and  perhaps  rationalization  of trade
administration  procedures  in  some  cases.
O  Organizational  and  managerial  improvements  in  key  sectoral- iii  -
institutions  may  have  occurred,  and  the  reduction  of institutional
proliferation  in some  crucial  economic  sectors  may  have led  to
improved  performance.
o  A reduction  in  the  number  of civil  servants  and  a redefinition  of
the  role  of the  civil  service  may have  occurred  on a limited  basis
in some  countries.
Despite  some  success,  movement  on institutional  reforms  has  been  halting
for  the  following  reasons:  1)  weaker  than  expected  management  capacity  unable
to absorb  excessive  reform  demands;  2) ripid  turnover  of  management  and
political  leaders;  3) poorly  executed  technical  assistance  and  inadequate
training  of local  staff  in  skills  necessary  to implement  and  sustain  reforms;
4) failure  to install  systems  and  routine  procedures  that  can  be
institutionalized  and internalized  by borrowers  over  time;  and,  5) failure  to
monitor  and  supervise  reform  programs  to  keep  them  on track.
The  dissonance  between  SAL  schedules  and  the  longer  time  horizons
required  for  institutional  development  also  constrained  reform  efforts. But
some  high speed  eleme!nts  of SALs  act  as a trigger  for  some  public  sector
management  reforms  by exerting  leverage  for  politically  difficult  actions  and
by focusing  attention  on the  urgency  of some  reforms. Moreover,  serial  SALs
may allow  for  more gradual  development  of institutional  capacity. SALs  may
also  be followed  by sector  adjustment  loans  to  ensure  a longer  sequence  of
institutional  reform.
Technical  assistance  that  is tightly  coordinated  with SAL  reforms
enhances  the  chances  of institutional  success. Most longer  term  public  sector
management  issues  have  been  addressed  through  TALs. But  TAL  schedules  are
often  driven  by SAL  timing  requirements,  leading  to inadequate  preparation  of
T.A.  projects. Technical  assistance  was often  poorly  delivered  and
expatriate-dominated,  providing  little  transfer  of skills  to  nationals.
Institutionalization  of public  sector  management  reforms  has been
difficult,  and  some  impruvements  have  unraveled  or  been reversed  over  time.
It  may  be unrealistic,  however,  to  view institutional  change  as  monotonic  or
linear. The  likelihood  of sustained  reform  is  also  linked  to government
commitment.  The  findings  of this  review  suggest  that  regimes'  willingness  to
carry  through  on institutional  reform  vary  with the  state  of the  economy,  the
nature  of  political  opposition,  and  the  degree  to  which  leaders  agree  with the
substance  of the  reform  measures.
General  design  problems  affecting  SALs  in  general  are  also  significant
for  institutional  items. Thes"  include  the  excessive  number  of institutional
conditions  attached  to SALs.  and  the  weak  monitoring  and  supervision  of
institutional  components. Tranching,  though  under  criticism  with regard  to
overall  conditionality,  may serve  a useful  institutional  purpose,  however,  by
prolonging  Bank-country  dialogue  and  encouraging  ongoing  monitoring  of
institutional  components.
Political  factors  are  enormously  important  to institutional  reform  in- iv -
SALs  and  not  well analyzed  in  the  Bank. Greater  attention  to these  issues  is
needed  in  sector  work.  Preparatory  sector  work  ln  general  was  important  in
public  sector  management  reforms  in  SALs.
Most  SALs seemed  to  promote  the  creation  of  new  inatitutLons,  raLsing
concerns  about  institutional  proliferation.
Publlc  sector  management  reforms  that  from  the  outset  could  be  linked  to
actionable  steps  agreed  upon  by  Bank  and  borrower  stood  a  better  chance  of
being  successfully  implemented.  Those  Lnstitutional  reforms  for  which
routinized  methodologies  were  put  in  place  had  a  greater  chance  of  being
sustalned  over  time.I. INTRODUCTION
This  review  examines  public  sector  management  issues  in  structural
adjustment  lending.  It  focuses  on those  institutional  aspects  of  structural
adjustment  that  deal  specifically  with  "macro-management"  issues;  that  is,
those  issues  related  to  improvements  in  the  management performance  of  core
central  governmet  institutions  and  to  rstemlc  changes  in  the  public
administration.1, 
The  paper  delineates  the  overall  objectives  of  Bank  public  sector
management interventions  linked  to  adjustment  programs,  surveys  the  range  of
actions  undertaken  through  structural  adjustment  loans  and  credits  (SALs  and
SACs) and  related  4echnical  assistance  loans  and  credits  (TALs and  TACs),
identifies  key  implementational  problems  connected  with  these  actions,  and,
to  the  extent  possible,  assesses  their  impact.
Analytic  Framework
Two  broad  types  of  institutional  reforms  are  considered.  The  first  type
consists  of  those  items  constituting  institutional  support  for  specific
economic  policy  reforms  contained  in  SALs  (e.g.,  the  simplification  of
administrative  procedures  for  export  incentives  to  support  trade
liberalization).  The second  type  includes  those  institutional  reforms  that  in
and  of  themselves  are  considered  critical  to  successful  adjustment  (e.g.,
governient  wage bill  reduction  aud  civil service retrencbaeiet). To a
considerable  degree,  both types  of  interventions  are  fundamentally  associated
with  the  emrgence  of  structural  adjustment  lending  from  the  late  19709
forward.  Although  Bank  lending  did  support  some  institutional  reforms  prior
to  1980,  these  were  mostly  limited,  sector-specific  interventions,  undertaken
either  through  project-related  lending  or  through  free-standing  technical
assistance.  The increased  implementation  requirements  imposed  by  major
economic  adjustment  exercises  in  many borrower  countries,  however,  highlighted
the  need  to  strengthen  institutional  capacity  for  policy  formulation  and
program  execution.  Therefore,  structural  adjustment  lending  pursued  a  wider
range  of  reforms  of  core  economic  policy  and  management institutions.  In
addition,  deficiencies  in  the  borrowers'  overall  public  administration  systems
increasingly  came  to  be  acknowledged  as  contributing  significantly  to  poor
government  performance  as  well  as  to  distortions  in  the  economy.  Thus,  SAL-
related  institutional  approaches  represented  a  more targeted  institutional
intervention,  focused  directly  on  specific  policy  outcomes.  In  this  way they
differed  not  only  from  institutional  work  done  through  Bank projects  in
individual  sectors,  but  also  from  the  more  general,  extensive  exercises  in
institutional  capacity  building  that  characterized  much institutional
1/  For  a  treatment  of  institutional  issues  related  to  state  enterprise  reform
in  adjustment  lending,  see  John  Hellis,  OA  Review  of  Public  Enterprise
Reform  in  Adjustment  Lending,  11989.  An  assessment  of  institutional  issues
in sector  adjustment  lending  is found  in Samuel  Paul, lnstitutional
Reforms  in  Sector  Adjustment  Operations,'  1989.-2-
develoruent  activity  carried  out  by various  other  donors  prior  to the  advent
of  adjustment  lending. 2'
To a  degree,  these  earlier  institutional  reforms  thus  proceeded  on a
slow,  sometimes  meandering  track,  often  prompting  frustration  and  impatience
at their  limited  impact. Structural  adjustment  lending  attempted  to carry  out
certain  urgent  institutional  reforms  in  the 'fast  lane,"  concentrating  on only
a few  key items  with relatively  short  time  horizons. Is the  present
adjustment  oriented  approach  to  public  sector  management  reform  working?
After  ten  years  of adjustment  lending  what  can  be said  about  the  achievements
in institutional  terms? What  alternative  models  or instruments  might  work
better? In its  examination  of the  institutional  experience  with SALs  to  date,
this  review  tries  to  address  some  of these  questions. The  analytic  approach
employed  does  not,  by and  large,  emphasize  the  substantive  content  of
individual  components  of the  SAL  reform  package. Thus,  conclusions  about  best
practice  with regard  to specific  reforms  of the  tax  administration  system,  for
example,  are  not drawn. The  analysis  focuses  instead  on generic  institutional
themes  that  transcend  individual  substantive  components. These  include  issues
such  as the  timing  or sequencing  of institutional  reforms,  the  extent  to  which
reforms  are  successfully  institutionalized  or sustained  over  time,  and  the
degree  of government  commitment  to  change. Issues  of internal  Bank  practice
regarding  analytic  preparation,  design,  and  supervision  of structural
adjustment  lending  are  also  treated.
Hethods
Sources  for  this  paper  included  secondary  materials,  president  and  staff
appraisal  reports,  supervision  audits,  projezt  completion  reviews,  and,  where
available,  OED  ex post  evaluations.  File  documentation  was also  consulted  for
some  countries. For  selected  country  cases,  key informant  interviews  were
conducted  with Bank  staff.  (The  country  cases  examined  in  depth  includeds
Kenya,  Cote  d'Ivoire,  Panama,  Jamaica,  Ghana,  Gambia,  Senegal,  Turkey,  Togo
and  Thailand.) Both  SALs  and,  where  applicable,  their  companion  TALs  were
analyzed.
It is important  to emphasize  that  the  types  of institutional  questions
posed  by this  study  cannot  be adequately  addressed  by a desk review. The
impoverishment  of institutional  information  in  most internal  Bank  documents  --
particularly  with regard  to implementation  issues  --  and the  necessarily
partial  perspective  of Bank  personnel  interviewed  can  at best  support  only
inconclusive  findings. These  findings  can  provide  working  hypotheses  to  be
expanded  and  verified  through  a  more intensive  analysis  based  on field  visits
and  interviews  with  borrower  country  participants  in  SAL  programs.
These  data  constraints  have  meant  that :he  criteria  for  evaluating
results  of a given  component  were often  limited  to  whetner  inputs  were
2/  Such extensive interventions  typified  much of the institutional  work
sponsored  by the  United  Nations  and  by the  U.S.  Agency  for  International
Development,  two  of the  agencies  most  active  in  this  area  in  the  1960s  and
19709.-3-
successfully  put in  place  through  a SAL  or  TAL.  The  degree  to  which  the
delivery  of these  inputs  could  be associated  with particular  outputs  or
outcomes  was  not always-possible  to &nalyze.
Finally,  this  paper  should  be  viewed  as  a  cumulative  product  as it draws
heavily  from  a previous  CECPS  paper,  "Institutional  Reform:  Some  Lessons  from
Structural  Adjustment  Lending,*  written  by  Geoffrey  Lamb in  1984.
The following  section  presents  an overview  of the  types  of institutional
components  incorporated  into  SAL  programs. The  third  section  identifies
common  institutional  issues  that  have  emerged  in the  implementation  process.
The  final  section  draws  some  conclusions  about  this  experience.
II.  OVERVIEW  OF INSTITTUTIONAL  COMPQOENTS  IN  SALS AND TALS
As  of  June 1988,  significant  public  sector  management  components  were
present  in all  fifty-nine  structural  adjustment  loans. Of these,  thirty-one
were in  Africa;  seven  in  Asia;  thirteen  in  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean;
and  eight  in  EMENA.  In  all,  forty-three  Technical  Assistance  Loans  have
provided  spocific  institutional  support  for  these  SALs. Well  over  half  of
these  T.A.  projects  were in  Africa. The  others  were  distributed  between  EMENA
and  LAC;  Asia  had  none.  (Annex  1 shows  all  approved  SALs  and  TALs  with
institutional  comDonents.  Annex  2 gives  a regional  breakdown  of SALs with
institutional  components  as of June  1988. Annex  3 shows  the  distribution  and
relative  importance  of different  institutional  reform  components  for  SALs  and
TALs. Annex  4 shows  the  frequency  and  regional  distribution  of institutional
components  in structural  adjustment  and  related  technical  assistance  loans  as
of June  1988.)
Most institutional  components  of  SALs  &re  directly  linked  to  the
economic  policy  reforms  of the  adjustment  process  itself. The  following
areas,  identified  by Lamb  in  his  1984  review  of SALs,  remain  prominent:
institutional  changes  required  for  macroeconomic  and  financial  management
(present  in  all  59 SALs),  non-financial  sectoral  institutional  reform  (found
in 56).  and,  trade  policy  and  administration  reforms  (present  in  50).  In
addition,  public  administration  reforms,  not strictly  part  of economic  policy
adjustment  but  considered  crucial  to public  expenditure  control,  and
government  performance  were  part  of 31 SALs. Within  these  broad  categories,  a
diverse  set  of activities  has  been  undertaken.  Although  results  have  varied,
some  common  patterns  of experience  can  be discerned. This  experience  is
discussed  in the  sections  below.
A.  ECONOMIC  AND  FINANCIAL  MANAGEMENT
The  most  common  institutional  feature  in SALs  has been  their  emphasis  on
improvements  in governments'  management  of core  economic  instruments.  As
Annex  3 shows, this  rubric  encompasses  a series  of activities  aimed  at
improving  the  functioning  of relevant  government  agencies. Measures-4-
undertaken  through  SALs include  the  following  (in  descending  order  of
frequency):  strengthening  of  muanagemext of  the  public  investzent  programming
process; strengthening  of institutional  mechanisms-for  national  planning;
creating  and/or  reinforcing  economic  policy-making  bodies;  improving  systems
for  debt  management;  Improving  institutional  mechanisms  for  tax
administration;  ref6rming  institutions  involved  in the  budget  process;
reforming  banking  and  financial  institutions;  and,  reforming  systems  for
accounting  and  auditing.
Many actions  taken  to increase  government  efficiency  in  economic  and
financial  management  were  designed  to  bring  about  short-term  improvements,
beginning  with initial  emergency  steps  (such  as  the  creation  of a SAL
oversight  committee  to ensure  loan  conditionality  compliance  for  tranche
release)  that  would  precede  longer-term  efforts  requiring  more complex  changeq
;n economic  management  and  public  administration  (such  as the  design  and
installation  of new systems  and  procedures  for  customs  administration).  The
types  of elements  that  make up these  economic  and  financial  management
components  are  elaborated  below.
i.  Public  Sector  Investment  Program  Management
Public  expenditure  .ntrol  was  viewed  as  key to  most  adjustment
programs,  and  improving  public  invetsi-nt  program  management  thus  became  a
frequent  reform  item  in  SAL  packages. Forty-eight  SALs  supported  by 12  TALs
(7  in  Africa  and  5 in  LAC)  contained  measures  to improve  public  investment
programming  (PIP)  management  and  to strengthen  its  links  to  budgetary  control.
The  actual  measures  varied  from  one  country  or one  SAL  to another,  but in
general,  SALs  promoted  high-level  coordination  of investment  decision  making,
improvement  in  planning  and  investment  mechanisms,  and  strengthening  of
investment  monitoring. Specific  actions  have  commonly  included  the
establishment  of  multi-year  rolling  public  investment  programs  as was
instituted  for  example,  in Pakistan,  or,  more immediately,  the  inventory  of
existing  investment projects  and  the installation  of a computerized
monitoring  system  for  ongoing  projects. In  Ghana,  for  example,  a central
project  monitoring  unit,  ultimately  destined  for  the  Ministry  of Finance  and
Economic  Planning,  was temporarily  housed  in the  World  Bank  resident  mission
during  SAC  I  preparation  because  its  activities  were considered  immediately
critical  to rationalization  of the  investment  process.
Efforts  to strengthen  financial  and  technical  project  preparation  and
evaluation  capacity  have  been  undertaken  in  planning  and  budgeting  units  in
ministries  of finance  and  planning  as  well as in sectoral  ministries. Such
efforts  have sometimes  involved  increasing  or enhancing  staff  capabilities  of
key  entities,  either  through  training  or recr  .'tment.  Enhanced  capacity  has
commonly  been  sought  through  the  use  of forei.s.,  consultants  financed  through
technical  assistance. In some  cases,  such  consultants  were charged  with
training  local  counterparts;  in  most instances,  however,  they  were hired  to
carry  out specific  tasks  themselves.  In some  instances,  such  as SAL  II in
Kenya,  systems  and  methods  were standardized  in a  handbook  for  project
evaluation  subsequently  adopted  by the  Treasury,  and  new regulations  for
regular  review  of projects  were introduced.Improvements  in  the  public  investment  progrmding process  have involved
reorganization  of  planning  and  budgeting  structures.  The  organizational
arrangements  endorsed  by SALs  varied. Some  reorganization  efforts
strengthened  coordination  among  ministries  of finance  or planning  and  other
- key  agencies,  such  as t.i  Ministry  of Comerce and  Industry  in  the  Central
African  Republic. Others  promoted  the  establishment  or reinforcement  of a
planning  agency  separate  from  the  Ministry  of Finance. This  occurred  in  Ghana
and  in  Jamaica  (in  the  latter  case  with the  creation  of the  Planning  Institute
of  Jamaica). In a few  countries,  reorganization  strengthened  centralized
control  of the  budgeting  process. In the  Cote  dl'voire,  for  example,  the
Ministry  of Finance  and  Economic  Planning  was  at the  center  of this  effort.
In general,  Bank staff  report  that  the  direction  and  shape  of these
reorganization  schemes  were  determined  less  by a technical  prescription  of the
best  organizational  arrangemeuts  for  planning  activities  than  by the
institutional  preferences  and  traditions  of governments  themselves.
Public  investment  prograumming  evolved  in  many  different  ways.  In  Togo,
for  example,  PIP  reform  began  with the  introduction  of  macroeconomic  planning
linked  to the  establishment  of procedures  for  investment  project  monitoring  on
a quarterly  basis. The  reform  was  carried  out  by expatriate  consultants  with
minimal  emphasis  on training  of  nationals.  In the  Gambia,  SAL  T  sought  to
strengthen  core  and  sectoral  institutions  involved  in  the  public  investment
programming  process  through  technical  assistance  and  training  and  the
promotion  of routinized  review  of projects. In  Turkey,  efforts  to rationalize
the  PIP  process  with the  ultimate  aim  of reducing  the  number  of projects  in
the  investment  program  were  phased-in  gradually  over  a period  of five  SALs.
Key institutions,  such  as the  Evaluation  Unit for  Special  Projects,  were
upgraded  through  technical  assistance  and  training.
It is  exceedingly  difficult  to  assess  the  results  of these  diverse
efforts  at reform. Interviewed  Bank  staff  conveyed  partial,  conflicting  or
inconclusive  impressions  as to the  degree  of progress  achieved. They  reported
improvements  in  Togo,  Jamaica,  Gambia  and  Turkey,  but  in Kenya  repeated  delays
in the  preparation  of a rolling  public  investment  program  (in  conjunction  with
a forward  budgeting  system)  led  to a  nine  month  delay  in  tranche  release  in
SAL  II.  Poorly  trained  staff  and  high  management  turnover  la the  sectoral
ministries  exacerbated  the  weak PIP  performsnce.
In the  Central  African  Republic,  the  management  capacity  of  key agencies
was overwhelmed  by attempts  in  SAL  I to introduce  a series  of simultaneous
reforms,  including  PIP  improvements,  and  the  entire  reform  agenda  slipped
behind  schedule. In Bolivia,  SAL  I  efforts  to strengthen  expenditure  control
and  investment  planning  in the  Ministry  of Planning  and  Coordinat'on  were
deemed  unsuccessful  because  no systematic  procedures  were  set  up to ensure
analysis  and  execution  of future  investment  programs. Even  the  more positive
Turkish  experience  was  not  an unqualified  success. Despite  significant  cuts
in the  annual  growth  in  public  investment  (frem  18  percent  to 2  percent  over
the  period  of five  SALS),  the  PIP  still  included  some  6000  projects,  and  by
the  end  of SAL  V there  remained  a clear  need  to strengthen  institutional
planning  capabilities  in sector  ministries  and  agencies. After  the  end  of theSALs  the  growth  in the  Turkish  PIP  rose  again,  to about  1OZ  per  annum  in the
period  1985-1987.
In  Jamaica,  SALs  were used  to  develop  PIPs  that  for  the  first  time
linked  investments  and  the  mid term  macro-economic  framework. Under  Sal  III  a
three  year  rolling  PIP  program  established  a direct  connection  with the
government's  Medium  Term  Economic  Policy  Framework  for  the  period  1988-1991.
The  Senegalese  dialogue  with the  Bank  in SAL  II led  to a  comprehensive  study
of investment  programming  and  budgeting  systems. This  resulted  in some
improvements  in SAL  III,  including  the  1987  implemsntation  of a  computerized
monitoring  3ystem  for  the  physical  and  financial  execution  of  public
investments.  In the  Cote  d'lvoire,  PIP  reform  made some  headway  with support
from  a related  technicaf  assistance  loan  establishing  a  project  monitoring
unit  in the  Investment  Department  in the  Ministry  of Budget,  but deficiencies
in the  budgeting  process  and in  national  accounts  procedures  persisted
throughout  the  period  of SAL  I to III.
Although  some  reforms  did  occur,  these  experiences  suggest  that  the
process  has  been  difficult  and the  results  decidedly  mixed.  Slow  progress  has
been  linked  to the  difficvlties  borrowor  government  staff  have in  mastering
the  technical  skills  needed  to  manage  the  PIP  process. This  may be due  to the  -
failure  of technical  assistance  to provide  adequate  training  for  these
personnel  or perhaps  to the  inappropriateness  of the  systems  to the
peculiarities  of individual  country  circumstances.  Although  rarely  mentioned
by Bank  staff,  political  pressures  brought  to  bear  upon  the  investment
planning  process,  either  by external  interest  groups  or by internal
bureaucratic  actors,  may  well  have  derailed  some  reforms.
ii.  Economic  Policy  Bodies
Structural  adjustment  programs  often  responded  to  deficiencies  in
macroeconomic  policy-making  capacity  by promoting  the  creation  of new  economic
policy-making  bodies  or the  strengthening  cf already  existing  ones.  Such
entities  were  part  of 26 SALs  and  18 supporting  TALs,  of  which  about  three-  -
fourths  were in  Africa. Examples  include  the  National  Development  Planning
Commission  in  Gtina,  the  Financial  Coordination  and  Investment  Control
Committee  in the  Cote  d'Ivoire,  the  National  Economic  Policy  Steering
Committee,  created  in  Thailand  to  coordinate  macroeconomic  management  with the
National  Economic  and  Social  Development  Board,  and  the  National  Economic
Council  in  Mauritius. In some  cases,  these  bodies  were set  up to carry  out
policy  functions  on a long-term  basis,  in  the  absence  of established
government  institutions.  In other  instances,  entities  were put  in place
precisely  to  deal  with immediate  SAL  requirements.  The  Comite  de Suivi  et
Reflexion  in  the  Cote  d'Ivoire  was conceived  thusly. Its  purpose  was to
monitor  the  progress  of SAL  activities  and serve  as  an informed  interlocutor
with the  Bank  SAL  team. Although  it  was  hoped  that  this  group  would
eventually  become  permanently  institutionalized  in  the  Ivoirian  policy
environment,  its  explicit  brief  was  more  directly  linked  to  short-term  SAL
demands.-7-
The  record  of such  bodies  has  been  mixed. When constituted  primarily
for  SAL  purposes,  they  proved  4ifficult  to sustain  in  the  absence  of
persistent  Bank  prodding  and  funding. Indeed,  some  officially  constituted
committees  never  materialized  as real  working  groups.  In  Malawi,  for  example,
the  Investment  Coordination  Committee  that  was  to review  public  investments
never  took  form,  and  its  mandate  was eventually  assumed  by the  Economic
Planning  Department  in the  Office  of  the  President  and  Cabinet.  Bodies  that
succeeded  in  becoming  more institutionalized  sometimes  became  policy  enclaves,
isolated  from  other  parts  of government  and  siphoning  off  managerial  talent
from  central  bureaucratic  organs.  Both  the  Thai  NESDB  and  the  Economic
Liaison  Unit  established  under  SAC I  in  Ghana  suffered  such  criticism.
The  overall  impact  of  these  groups  on  the  adjustment  process  is  also
hard  to assess,  although  it  may  be easier  to detect  the  adverse  effect  on
adjustment  programs  when such  mechanisms  do  not  exist. In Turkey,  the  absence
of a strong  central  institution  with responsibility  for  keeping  the
macroeconomic  adjustment  program  on track  led,  according  to involved  Bank
staff,  to the  aforementioned  slippage  in  public  sector  investment  program
reforms.  In Bolivia,  the  failure  to  establish  a central  coordinating  body to
follow  up on  policy  measures  put  in  place  during  preparation  and  execution  qf
SAL  I partly  explained,  according  to  Bank  staff,  the  diminished  impact  of SAL
programs  ont  the  economy.
Occasionally,  the  above  bodies  were coincident  with those  special
project  units  set  up to  administer  a  number  of SALs. Such  units  sometimes
acted  as secretariats  for  the  economic  policy-making  bodies  described  above,
and  they  were oftejn  staffed  with the  best  and  the  brightest  from  local
technocratic  elites,  many  drawn  directly  from  the  central  bureaucracy.  Most
Bank  staff  contended  that  these  units  constituted  an essential  mechanism  for
effective  SAL  management,  however,  and  that  this  talent  diin was justified  by
the  urgent,  short-term  requirements  of SAL  program  implementation.  Rarely  was
explicit  attention  given  to  the  effect  of this  drain  on the  ability  of  other
parts  of central  government  to  carry  out routine  functions. In countries
where  skilled  human  capital  was scarce,  this  often  constituted  a significant
problem.
iii. Debt  Management  Systems
Reductions  in international  trade  and  declining  commodity  prices  have
underscored  the  importance  of  management  of the  foreign  debt  to successful
adjustment.  Thirty-three  SALs  accompanied  by 7  TALs (about  one-half  in
Africa)  instituted  changes  in  debt  management  arrangements.  The  reforms
usually  involved  the  establishment  or reinforcement  of institutions  to  monitor
and  control  debt  and  the  development  of systems  to  feed  pertinent  information
on debt  into  budgeting  and  public  investment  programs. In  particular,  reforms
emphasized  coordinating  efforts  to link  line  ministries  and  financial
authorities  (such  as central  banks)  into  debt  management  systems. Under  the
SAL  programs  Thailand  developed  a comprehensive  three  year  rolling  program  for
public  foreign  borrowing. Bank  staff  report,  though,  that  the  analytical
capability  to  utilize  fully  the  available  computer  facilities  is stilllacking. The  Cote d'Ivoire,  on the  other  hand,  reportedly  strengthened  its
system  for  debt  manaBement  under  SAL  I  with the  computerization  of debt
management  information  and  close  monitoring  of guarantees  and internal  debt
repayment  schedules.
SALs  introduced  computerized  debt  management  systems  into  a number  of
countries,  including  Malawi,  Mauritius,  Niger  and  Panama. Some  countries  set
up or reinforced  special  units  to  monitor  debt. A  debt  monitoring  unit  was
established  in  the  Treasury  in  Malavi  and  became  an  important  management  tool.
Despite  this  success,  Bank  staff  commented  that  by  the  end  of  SAL II,  a
coherent  strategy  and  plan  for  debt  management  still  needed  to  be developed.
This  was taking  much longer  than  the  SAL  program  had  anticipated.
Indeed,  the  degree  to  which  the  introduction  of these  mechanisms  has
transformed  debt  management  practices  remains  to  be seen.  Turkey,  for
example,  introduced  a  SQries  of institutional  improvements  for  debt  management
over  the  course  of five  SALs.  After  extensive  studies  in SALs  I and  II,
improvements  in external  debt reporting  and  computerization  along  with staff
strengthening  through  training  and  outside  recruitment  were carried  out  in the
Ministry  of Finance  in SAL  III. Nonetheless,  by SAL  IV debt  manaBLment  was
still  thought  to be  unsatisfactory,  despite  the  Government's  stated  overall
commitment  to the  SAL  policy  dialogue. Bank  staff  attribute  this
disappointing  performance,  at least  in  part,  to the  Government's  failure  to
reconcile  its  conflicting  goals  of decentralizing  authority  to line  ministries
with the  need for  the  Central  Bank  to  assert  authority  over  external  debt.
In general,  SAL  implementation  has  yielded  more transparent  procedures
and  more streamlined  mechanisms  for  debt  management  at least  in the  short
term,  but the  institutionalization  of real,  meaningful  controls  over  debt
management  processes  may be  more elusive  and  difficult  than  many SAL  designers
originally  envisaged.
iv.  Tax  Administration
As part  of the  process  of rationalizing  the  macroeconomic  framework,
efforts  have also  focused  on the  revenue  side  of government  adjustment
programs,  addressing  the  need  for  reform  of tax  administration  institutions
and  procedures. Institutional  components  dealing  with tax  administration  were
found  in 33 SALs  supported  by 7  TALs (Africa  accounted  for  one-half  and the
rest  were distributed  among  LAC,  EMENA  and  Asia).
Measures  to  upgrade  the  efficiency  of tax  administration  have  been
diverse  and  defy  easy  generalization.  In several  cases,  such  as Togo,  efforts
have  been  made to develop  a  new tax  code,  with  good  results. In  Dominica,
customs  administration  procedures  were streamlined.  Similar  measures,
involving  the  reduction  of the  export  tax  on cashews  and  improvements  in  tax
collection  procedures,  were  undertaken  through  SAL  I in  Guinea  Bissau. In
Thailand,  fiscal  policy  and  related  tax  administration  procedures  were a  key
feature  of the  SAL  programs. A revenue  projection  model  was  developed  for
multi-year  revenue  planning  and  annual  budgeting  purposes,  replacing  the-9-
purely  ad  hoc annual  extrapolations  previously  utilized.  Concomitant  efforts
were  made to streamline  and standardize  tax  administration  proceduAres  through
organizational  changes  in the  revenue,  customs  and  excise  departments.
Turkey's  SALs  also  aimed  at better  tax  admin_.stration.  While  improvements
occurred  during  SALs  II and  III,  budget  deficits  as a share  of GyP started  to
rise  by SAL  IV.  One  factor  contributing  to  these  mixed  results  was the-
emergence  of autonomous  agencies  (using  extra-budgetary  funds)  that  preempted
some  tax  reserves  while  increasing  the  overall  level  of expenditure.
B.  NON-FINANCIAL  SECTOR  REFORMS
Institutional  measures  in  most  SALs  went  beyond  the  core  economic  and
financial  institutions  to support  sectoral  restructuring  and  policy  reforms.
All  but three  SALs  contained  such  components. Sectoral  institutional  reforms
have  emphasized:  1) institutional  support  for  policy  changes  involving  the
liberalization  of price  and  incentive  structures;  2) improving  capacity  for
strategic  planning  in sectoral  organs;  and  3) reorganization  of sectoral
institutions.  Sectoral  institutional  components  have  been  heavily  concentrated
in  agriculture  (45  SALs  and  14 TALs)  and  industry  (39  SALs  and  16 TALs).
Energy,  an institutional  component  in 17  SALS  and  6  TALs,  lagged  considerably
behind  as the  third  most  prominent  sector. In descending  order  of importance,
operational  components  providing institutional  support  for  policy  reforms
were  distributed  among  the  following  additional  sectors:  health  and  social
security  (9  SALs  and  6  TALs);  transportation  (7  SALs  and 1  TAL);  population  (5
SALs  and  2 TALs);  water  and  urban  development  (2  SALs  and  2  TALs); and
housing  (2  SALs  and  1 TAL).
i.  Agriculture  Reforms
Institutional  reforms  in  agricultural  sectors  frequently  stressed
reorganization  of sectoral  institutions.  They  typically  emphasized
improvements  in  policy  analysis,  strategic  planning  and  monitoring  capacity,
and  overall  reduction  of the  size  and  number-of  institutions  operating  in  the
sector.
In the  Gambia,  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture  was streamlined  (in
conjunction  with an overall  public  administration  reform)  and  priority  was
given  to functions  of strategic  planning  and  monitoring. In Senegal,  large
rural  development  agencies  were restructured  and  their  staffs  reduced.
Planning,  investment  programming,  budgeting  and statistical  analysis  were
strengthened  in the  Ministry  of  Rural  Development.  In Cote  d'Ivoire,  an
important  additional  element  was  a series  of  management  studies  to  be carried
out  on principal  agencies  in  the  sector. In  Kenya,  SAL  II supported  a
previously  launched  effort  to strengthen  the  institutional  capacity  of the
Ministry  of  Agriculture  through  improved  budgeting,  computerization  of project
monitoring  and  personnel  management,  the  introduction  of a system  of timely
expenditure  reporting,  and  the  quicker  release  of authority  to incur
expenditure.- 10  -
SALs  have sought  to strengthen  agricultural  sector  institutions  in
support  of liberalization  of  pricing  policies,  removal  of subsidies  for  inputs
and  the  reduction  of the  role  of the  state  generally  in  marketing  and
production. Institutional  support  for  these  reforms  consisted  of studies
(e.g.  in  Togo,  Cote  d'Ivoire,  Kenya,  Senegal),  creation  of  new institutional
mechanisms  such  as the  Price  Analysis  Unit  of the  Export  Czip  Marketing  Board
in Togo  or the  Task  Force  on Budget  and  Financial  Management  in the  Ministry
of  Agriculture  and  Livestock  Development  in  Kenya,  or,  in so'le  instances,  the
total  or partial  elimination  of institutions.
A  good  number  of  organizational  reforms  sought  to  limir.  the  activities
of  government  institutions  in  various  aspects  of agricultural  marketing  and
production. In  Jamaica,  major  commodity  marketing  boards  were divested  of all
non-marketing  functions,  and  private  sector  participation  in external
marketing  of export  crops  was promoted. In  Cote  d'Ivoire,  the  sugar  marketing
board  (SODESUCRE)  was reorganized  and  various  of its  direct  refining
operations  liquidated. SAL  I in  Panama  generated  some  broad  institutional
changes  in support  of liberalization  policies. This  was effected  mainly
through  the  passage  of legislation  prompted  by Bank-country  policy  dialogue.
The  Agricultural  Incentives  Law  of 1986  abolished  import  substitution  targets,
reduced  import  duties  on food  crops,.and  announced  the  end  of crop  purchasing
by the  National  Rice  Institute  as  well  as the  abolition  of the  crop-pledging
system  of the  Agricultural  Development  Bank,  a  condition  of second  tranche
release  in  SAL  II.  Each  of these  reforms  resulted  in  the limiting  or
elimination  of functions  of the  supervising  institution.
ii.  Industry  Reforms
In industry,  major  institutional  reforms  were  often  linked  to changes  in
the  trade  regime,  usually  involving  rationalization  of the  structure  of
industrial  regulatory  institutions  and  procedures.  This  mainly  involved
efforts  to reduce  the  proliferation  of institutions  and streamline
bureaucratic  processes  in  order  to  provide  an institutional  push  to exports.
A variety  of measures  were taken  through  SALs  to  achieve  these  ends.
In  Kenya's  SAL  program  improvements  in the  administration  of industrial
investment  incentives  were sought  through  the  constitution  of an
interministerial  New  Projects  Committee. In an effort  to  apply  standardized
technical,  financial  and  economic  viability  criteria  to  government  investment
decisions,  this  committee  was charged  with the  review  of all  proposed
projects. In  Thailand,  the  emphasis  was on reducing  the  case-by-case.
discretionary  basis  of investment  decisions  by developing  practices  to clarify
qualification  criteria  and  procedures.
In the  Cote d'Ivoire,  it  proved  difficult  to establish  a system  of
export  financing  and  credit  insurance. The  unit  to  monitor  the industrial
reform  that  was to be located  in the  Ministry  of Industry  was  never
established,  in  part  because  the  Ministry  was reluctant  to  use technical
assistance  funds  to set  up the  office. Bank  staff  cite  the  failure  of
government  to liberalize  the  manufacturing  sector  in the  Cote  d'Ivoire  as a- 11  -
reflection  of  the  overly  ambit-ious  and  politically  unrealistic  nature  of SALs
II end  III.  Indeed,  price  liberalization  measares  taken  under  SAL  II in  the
shoe  end  textile  industries  were rescinded  in  SAL  III in  response  to  heavy
political  pressure  placed  upon  the  President  by the  Ivoirian  industrialist
lobby.
iii. Trade  Administration  Reforms
In its  policy  dialogues  on structural  adjustment,  the  Bank  has
consistently  pushed  for  more  liberal  trade  regimes. Policy  reforms  have
included  moves  to abolish  quantitative  restrictions,  lower  tariffs  in  concert
with the  maiW-qnance  of a realistic  exchange  rate  policy,  end  establish  an
incentive  structure  neutral  between  import  substitution  or export  generating
activities.  Although  most  countries  have  taken  only  incremental  steps  in
these  directions,  a  number  have  undertaken  a series  of institutional  changes
in  support  of  the  kinds  of  trade  reforms  promoted  through  structural
adjustment  lending.  Many  institutional  reforms  in  this  area  sought  to  replace
complicated  systems  of import  and  *xport  quotas  and  licenses  with simplified
tariff  systems.  Gabon,  Burundi,  and  Central  African  Republic,  among  many
others,  followed  this  route.  Countries  streamlining  institutions  or
proceduzal  arrangements  for  trade  administration  included  the  Cote  d'Ivoire
(which  created  en  export  credit  insurance  system  under  SAL  III)  and  the  Gambia
(which  liberalized  exchange  control  procedures  so  that  commercial  banks  were
not  required  to submit  detailed  documentation  to the  Central  Bank  when paying
for  commercial  import  transactions).
Several  countries  carried  out  studies  of various  parts  of their  trade
regimes  under  SALs.  In  Turkey,  a  SAL I  study  was  undertaken  to  set  up  a joint
public-private  export  promotion  center.  (It  was  revitalized  under  SAL II.)  In
Turkey's  SAL  V another  study  examined  the  possibility  of introducing  a system
of  credit  for  indirect  exporters.
Trade  reform  also  prompted  the  creation  of  new  agencies  and  the
reinforcement  of  old  ones.  An Export  Development  Bank was  created  in  Turkey
under  SAL II,  and  in  Burundi  the  Bureau  of  Standards  was  created  under  SAL I
to  ensure  the  quality  of  the  country's  exports.  In  several  countries  (Central
African  Republic  and  the  Gambia),  existing  organizations  such  as  the  Chamber
of  Commerce were  strengthened.  In  Thailand,  the  Export  Development  Committee
was  created.
In  some  countries,  revision  of  existing  regulatory  and  investment  codes
or  new  draft  tariff  codes  were  the  main  institutional  steps  taken  toward  trade
liberalization.  This  occurred,  for  example,  in  Gabon  and  Senegal.  Several
countries  put  drawback  systems  in  place.  In  others,  export  declaration
systems  replaced  export  authorization  systems  (Central  African  Republic),  and
in  still  others  (Sao  Tome)  import  license  auction  systems  were  developed  for
non-essential  imports.- 12  -
As the  above  sections  suggest,  sectoral  reforms  clearly  constituted  an
important  aspect  of  many SAL  programs. At the  same  time,  Bank staff  reported
an increasing  inclination  and/or  preference  for  dealing  with  sectoral
institutional  issues  through  sector  adjustment  operations  rather  than  through
structural  adjustment  umbrellas. It  would  appear,  nevertheless,  that  SALs  are
still  the  instrument  of choice  for  sectoral  reforms  if:  1) the  sectoral  issue
is important  enough  to the  overall  economy  and  essential  to the  adjustment
process;  2) the  country  is small  enough  that  administrative  efficiencies  can
be gained  by a  centralized  SAL  effort  and sectoral  reforms  can  be linked  to
more central  structural  reforms  without  fear  of the  whole  package  being
sabotaged  because  of lack  of political  comitment on one  or another  single
item;  or,  3)  structural  adjustment  can  be used  as a  means  to  provide
reinforcing  cross-conditionality  on sectoral  reform  issues.
In general,  though,  there  does  seem  to  be a  move from  the  early  use  of
SALs  for  sectoral  reforms  to SECALs in  more  recent  cases. This  stems,  in
part,  from  the  prevailing  belief  among  Bank  staff  that  it  is  generally  easier
to  get  countries  to  adopt  narrower,  more  specific  reforms.  Sectoral  line
agencies  are  more  likely  to  comprehend  the  technical  rationalization  for
specifl-  reforms  in  thoer  own  sectors  and  therefore  more  likely  to  agree  to
them moxe  readily.  Furthermore,  many  sectoral  reforms  can  proceed
independently  of  necessary  macroeconomic  reforms  and  thus  do  not  have  to  be
linked  to  larger  SAL programs.  It  has  also  been  suggested,  however,  that  the
price  for  such  reforms  has  come  high:  #t number  of  sectoral  reforms  once
-'.cluded  but  not  completed  in  earlier  SALs  (e.g.,  agricultural  reforms  in
Kenya)  have reappeared  in later  incarnations  in  more specific  SECALs.
C.  PUBLIC  ADMINISTRATION  REFORMS
Increasingly,  public  administration  reforms  have  become  prominent
institutional  components  of  structural  adjustment  lending.  Such  components
generally  comprise  civil  service  management  and/or  reorganization  reforms.
mostly  emphasizing  structural  changes  in  central  government  employment,  pay
and  incentive  systems. Of relatively  recent  origin,  reforms  in  public
administration  were components  in 23  SALs  between  1981  and  1987.  In addition,
thirteen  TALs  supported  these  SAL-driven  reforms. In  general,  these  reforms
were designed  to address  the following  problems: excessive  public  sector  wage
bills,  too  many civil  servants,  gradual  erosion  of  public  service  salaries,  or
wage compression  between  top  and  bottom  grade  levels  in  overall  salary
structures.
SALs  varied  in  the  depth  of their  treatment  of  civil  service  reform
issues. In reforming  public  pay  and  employment  systems,  SALs  sometimes  merely
set  global  reduction  targets  for  the  aggregate  wage bill (often  determined  in
collaboration  with the  IMF)  without  specifying  a strategy  to reach  these
goals. Such  gross  prescriptions  may actually  have  done  more  harm than  good,
since  countries  with  highly  compressed  salary  structures  sometimes  responded
to this  requirement  with simple,  across-the-board  wage restraint,  without
adequately  considering  the  complex  trade-offs  between  employment  and  pay.
Sometimes  the  inclusion  in  a SAL  of such  conditionalities  was intended  to- 13  -
encourage  the  continuation  of government  actions  already  taken. In  most
cases,  however,  the  Bank  did  specify  the  means  by  which  the  overall  wage  bill
might  be  reduced.  In  these  cases,  conditionality  was  introduced  to  restrain
salaries,  freeze  or reduce  employment  and  pay  in the  civil  service,  or,  where
necessary,  raise  civil  service  salaries,  usually  in  the  context  of an overall
reduction  in  civil  service  numbers
In  general,  the  TAL approach  to  public  employment  and  pay issues  was  to
provide  support  for  longer  term,  more  comprehensive  reform  efforts. Nine  TALs
sought  to strengthen  institutions  and  procedures  or to  collect  information
that  would  provide  the  foundation  for  more  radical  employment  and  pay  reforms
at  some  later  date.
Several  countries  have  embarked  on rather  ambitious  programs  of  public
administration  reform  that  have  been  supported  by  SALs,  including  Jamaica,
Ghana,  the  Gambia,  and  Thailand.  An  examination  of  these  cases  reveals  some
of  the  implementational  issues  arising  in  such  programs.
In  Jamaica,  administrative  and  budgeting  reforms  were  instituted  under
SALs  I  and  II  through  management  audits  of  core  ministries  and  initial  moves
toward  performance  budgeting.  As  the  program  of  reform  gaiqed  momentum it
developed  into  a $4.5  million  public  administration  reform  project  (mainly
comprising  technical  assistance),  strengthened  by crosscutting  conditionality
in  SAL III.  The  Administrative  Reform  Project  I  (ARP I)  focused  mainly  on
reforming  personnel  management  practices  in  central.government  through
strengthening  and  decentralizing  the  Ministry  of  the  Public  Service,  the
Public  Service  Commission  and  improving  staff  personnel  management
capabilities  in  the  line  ministries. In  addition,  it  sought  to  promote  and
deepen  budgeting  reforms  in  the  Ministry  of  Finance  and  relevant  parts  of
sectoral  ministries.  Finally,  ARP I  was  intended  to  support  public  pay
reforms  included  in  SAL III.
Although  progress  may  have  taken  place  for  some  elements  of  ARP I, the
program  as a  whole  remained  very  dependent  on the  Prime  Minister's  backing,
and  it  was continually  constrained  by the  absence  of  high  quality  managerial
staff  in the  civil  service. The  SAL  program  tried  to ease  this  constraint  --
with only  limited  success  --  by encouraging  pay  reform  to  attract  qualified
personnel  back into  civil  service  posts. SAL  IIT,  for  example,  instituted
conditionality  that  higher  level  management  posts  in the  civil  service  be
compensated  at 85 percent  of equivalent  grades  in  statutory  bodies  over  a
three-phase  pay  hike. Although  two  raises  for  managers  did  occur,  the
opposition  from  unionized  civil  servants  at lower  skill  levels  presented
obstacles  to  diffe.rential  wage increases  favoring  higher  grade  employees,  and
the  third  increase  to  bring  up higher  echelon  civil  servants  to the  desired
level  never  took  place. As a result  of this  delay  and  the  continuing  wage
erosion  through  inflation,  qualified  professionals  and  managers  are
increasingly  scarce  in  the  central  government.  Technical  analyses  supporting
the  pay  reform  policy  prescriptions  (i.e.  a pay  comparator  survey)  was to  be
supplied  through  the  Administrative  Reform  Project,  but  the  work  had  not  yet
been  completed  at the  project's  end  due  both  to internal  project  management- 14 -
constraints  and  possibly  also  to the  perception  that  this  reform  had fallen
off the  Prime  Minister's  agenda  and should  be given  a low  priority.
Such  reforms  may  indeed  have  slipped  into  low  or  even reverse  gear  in
Jamaica  in  the  post-adjustment  climate.  That  Jamaica  may  have  suffered  a  form
of  adjustment  fatigue'  can  be  seen  in  the  slippage  reported  to  have  occurred
with  regard  to  civil  service  retrenchment.  Although  approximately  20,000
emplovees  were laid  off  by central  government  over  the  last  three  years (at
the  urging  of the  IMF  rather  than  the  Bank),  it is suspected  that  some  portion
of these  workers  have  been  rehired.,
The  reasons  for  this  reversal  in  Jamaica  remain  hazy.  The  vast  majority
of redundant  workers  came from  local  governments  (counted  officially,  however,
as part  of the  central  civil  service). The  functions  of local  governments
were virtually  abolished  for  many  parishes  under  the  Seaga  regime. Some  of
these  functions  appear  to  have  been  contracted  out  to the  private  sector,  but
others  may  have  been reincorporated  into  central  government,  thus  explaining,
in  part,  some  rehiring. In  addition,  the  powerful  position  of unions  with
strong  links  to the  dominant  political  parties  may have influenced  central
government  managers  to  accept  old  staff  back into  their  jobs  despite  official
sanctions  against  this  practice.
In  Thailand,  the  broad  program  of SAL-supported  reform  included  (as  a
preliminary  step  to future  reforms)  a study  of civil  service  organization  and
compensation.  Although  Thai  reluctance  to  borrow  for  technical  assistance
curtailed  some  potential  reform  activities,  involved  Bank  staff  stated  that
the  process  of change  was  institutionalized,*  by being  actively  taken  up by
the  Cabinet's  administrative  reforms  committee. This  miade  the  reform  program
an integral  part  of government  decision  making  rather  than  an effort  remote
from  the  bureaucracy. The  cost  of this  support  might  have  been  the risk  of
politically-inspired  changes  in the  original  reform  concept,  but  this risk  was
substantially  avoided,  and  the  SAL  program  set  in  motion  a process  which  could
lead  to institutional  changes. These  changes  could  include,  eventually,  the
adoption  of proposals  currently  before  the  Cabinet  to  restructure  the  civil
service  pay  system  in  ordet  to recruit  higher  quality  staff  more effectively
in light  of rising  competition  from  the  parastatals  and  private  sector.
In  Ghana,  SAC  I included  conditionality  for  the  retrenchment  of civil
service  cadres  and the  reduction,  phased  over  a three  year  period,  of
personnel  expenditures  to between  5  and  6 percent  of GDP.  This  fairly
immediate  reduction  was considered  critical  to the  overall  success  of the
government's  economic  recovery  program. But  it  was recognized  that
implementation  of even  these  immediate  steps  would  require  enhanced
institutional  capacity. Longer-term  institutional  strengthening  of both  core
economic  policy  agencies  and  those  organs  charged  with the  management  of
cadres  in the  civil  service  would  necessitate  additional  support. This
support  was supplied  through  the  Structural  Adjustment  Institutional  Support
technical  assistance  project,  whose  components  included  studies  and  assistance
to improve  the  performance  of the  civil  service  in  carrying  out such  tasks  as
formulation  of salary  and  grading  policy,  functional  reviews  of central
government  agencies,  redeployment  of surplus  staff,  strengthening  the- 15 -
management  services  division,  and  training  and  career  development. This
project  offered  institutional  support  of a  more focused  nature  than  previous
SAL-related  T.A.  projects.
At the  time  of this  writing,  Bank staff  view Ghana's  pay and  employment
reforms  as a qualified  success. Approximately  11,000  civil  servants  were
retrenched  in 1987,  falling  somewhat  short  of the  15,000  target  set  by the
Bank  and  the  Fund.  The  government's  ability  to sustain  the  reform  program  in
the  face  of potential  political  opposition  to  the  retrenchment  scheme  remains
to  be demonstrated  of course. And,  despite  the  reiatively  focused  and
coherently  designed  nature  of the  technical  assistance  for  the  overall  civil
service  reform  program,  such  aspects  of implementation  as lay-offs  and
redeployment,  retraining,  severance  and  possible  credit  or incentive  schemes
were  not fully  designed  or costed  out,  resulting  in  some  delays  and,  at times,
some  concern  about  program  derailment.  There  are  also indications  that  perhaps
3000  civil  servants  had slipped  back  onto  the  government  payroll,  reversing  at
least  some  of the  positive  financial  effects  of the  employment  cuts.  Despite
these  qualifications,  Ghana,  nonetheless,  made important  strides  in its  reform
program.
In the  Gambia,  the  SAL  supported  a series  of clvil  service  reforms,
including  the retrenchment  of approximately  15  percent  of civil  service
employees  (which  proceeded  ahead  of schedule),  preparation  of a  comprehensive
program  c. organizational  changes,  improvements  in  personnel  management,
manpower  budgeting,  pay  and  grading,  and  functional  reviews. Although  there
were delays  in implementation  due  to difficulties  in assembling  technical
experts  to  assist  the  Gambians,  the  civil  service  reforms  are  thought  to  have
gone  well --  especially  the  retrenchment  exercise  --  partly  due  to the
preparatory  technical  analysis. This  analysis  provided  information  for
difficult  policy  decisions  about  where  the  redundancies  were and  how  workers
should  be dismissed. Dismissals  were carried  out  with considerable
sensitivity  to  political  and  social  factors. The  Establishment  Office,
charged  with the  overall  management  of the  retrenchment  exercise,  reportedly
avoided  firing  people  from  the  same  family  or tribe,  for  example. The
stability  of the  regime  and  the  popularity  of the  president  are  credited  with
the  smooth  execution  of the  program  so far. It is  assumed  that  many
retrenched  civil  servants  have  been  absorbed  into  airicultural  activities  in
the  countryside,  but  no monitoring  has taken  place.  I  Bank staff  expressed
concern.that  urban  unrest  may increase  with further  cuts  in  public  sector
employment.  The  true  test  of the  efficacy  of these  reforms  triggered  by the
SAL  in the  Gambia  as  well  as elsewhere  is the  degree  to  which  an  ongoing
process  of improvements  in civil  service  management  will  have  been set  in
motion. This  will depend  largely  on the  institutionalization  of establishment
control  systems  (including  a  computerized  link  between  personnel  records  and
3I  This  positive  view  may  need  to be revised  in  light  of a field  evaluation
which is to take place  in the  context  of an Africa  Department  Regional
Study  of  Cases  in  Pay  and  Employment  Reform,  scheduled  for  early  calendar
1989. Indeed,  interim  reports  on  progress  in  the  Gambian  case  have  raised
some  doubts  about  the  roseate  picture  presented  here.-16  -
the  payroll),  training  in  personnel  policy  and  manggement  techniques  for
Establishment  Ministry,  and  revamping  of  career  incentive  structures  for  the,
civil  service.
D.  SUMMARY  OF FINDINGS
Despite  the  methodological  limitations  mentioned  earlier,  the  data  upon
which  the  above  sections  wera  based  do suggest  the  following  emerging  trends
that  might  be substantiated  through  more rigorous  field  investigation:
o  In a few  instances,  improvements  in public  investment  programming
institutions  and  procedures  led  to or set  the  stage  for  budgetary
reform. Rolling  investment  programming  was  introduced  and
investment  project  monitoring  was tied  into  macroeconomic
planning.
o  Ne. institutional  mechanisms  for  dealing  with debt  management  have
been  established  in  some  countries;  improvements  in  coordination
between  ministries  and  central  banks  and  other  financial
authorities  have resulted.
o  A good  number  of economic  policy  institutions,  responsible  for
developing,  coordinating  and reviewing  macroeconomic  management  in
general,  and  adjustment  operations  in  particular,  have been
established,  with varying  impact. In some  cases,  these  bodies
have  assumed  an important  role  in economic  policymaking  and  in
Bank-country  dialogue. In  others,  they  have  become  enclaves,
divesting  scarce  human  resources  from  other  government  organs. In
still  others,  such  economic  policy  bodies  have  been short-lived,
failing  to  become  institutionalized  in the  country's  bureaucratic
environment.
o  New  agencies  have  arisen  to  deal  with trade  regime  reforms.
Although  this  has  sometimes  raised  the  spectre  of institutional
proliferation,  there  has  been  simplification  and  rationalization
of trade  administration  procedures  in  a number  of cases.
o  Organizational  and  managerial  improvements  in  key sectoral
institutions  has  occurred,  and  the  reduction  of the  number  of
institutions  operating  in  some  crucial  economic  sectors  has led  to
improved  performance.
o  A reduction  in  the  number  of civil  servants  and  a redefinition  of
the  role  of the  civil  service  has occurred  on a limited  basis  in
some  countries;  movement  toward  a  more  cost-effective  use  of civil
servants  has  also  taken  place.
Despite  qualified  successes  in  a number  of  areas,  however,  institutional
achievement  has  been,  for  the  most  part,  limited. Indeed,  many initially
successful  reforms  have  been reversed  subsequently.  Some  of the  reasons  for- 17 _
this  halting  progress  have  been  catalogued  above: 1)  weaker  than  expected
management  capacity  unable  to absorb  excessive  reform  demands;  2) rapid
turnover  of  management  and  political  leaders,  thus  breaking  the  continuity  of
the  learning  process  as  well as the  commitment  to reforms;  3)  poorly  executed
technical  assistance  and inadequate  training  of local  staff  in  skills
necessary  to  implement  and  sustain  reforms;  4)  failure  to  install  systems  and
routine  procedures  that  can  be  institutionalized  and  internalized  by borrowers
over  time;  and,  5) failure  to  monitor  and  supervise  reform  programs  to keep
them  on track.
Finally,  although  staff  training,  reorganization,  and  introduction  of new
management  techniqtxes  may  have *strengthened'  procedures  and  institutions,  a
link  between  such  improvements  and  better  government  performance  has  not  been
established  in  all  cases.
III.  SELECTED  OPERATIONAL  ISSUES
A number  of operational  issues  emerge  from  the  above  discussion  of
experience. Some  of these  issues  have  been identified  in earlier  reviews  of
SALs,  but  their  importance  has  been  confirmed  by the  accumulation  of  more
recent  evidence.
A.  TIMING
The  dissonance  between  SAL  schedules  and  the  longer  time  horizons
required  for  institutional  reform  has been  discussed  in  previous  analyses  of
SALs.  The  findings  of the  present  review  confirm  this  mismatch,  especiully
for  many of the  African  cases  where  institutional  structures  are  weak and  new
and  may take  a  generation  or  more  to develop  or recover. Most institutional
development  activities  in  the  SALs examined  in  this  review  were taking  much
longer  than  had.been  foreseen  in  SAL  design  --  if  they  were  being  implemented
at all. Although  many  Bank  staff  involved  in  puttiAg  together  SAL  programs
were  well aware  of this  problem,  schedules  and  deaC'lines  contained  in  action
plans  and  loan  agreements  continue  to  be unrealisti:  about  the  time  required
to  accomplish  institutional  reform.
Despite  these  commonly  expressed  frustrations  with  the  inadequacy  of
quick-disbursing  SALs  for  instiputional  reform,  however,  it  may also  be true
that  some  of the  high-speed  elements  of SALs can  sometimes  facilitate
institutional  change. SALs  can  act  as a trigger  for  some  public  sector
management  reforms  (such  as  pay  and  employment  measures),  both  by exerting
leverage  for  politically  difficult  actions  and  by simply  focusing  attention  on
the  urgency  of  certain  reforms.
Moreover,  it  may be something  of a caricature  to  depict  SALs  as
relentlessly  short  term.  For  a number  of  countries  (e.g.,  Turkey,  Cote
d'Ivoire,  Jamaica,  Togo,  Senegal),  SAL  programs  have  been implemented  and  were
conceived  originally  as serial  processes,  sequenced  over  periods  as long  as- 18  _
ten  years.  Th'is  is  probably  ample  time  at least  to  begin  the  institutional
development  process. (Over  a serial  succession  of SALs,  studies  can  become
actions  and  some *behaviors'  get  institutionalized;  public  investment
programming  methodologies  get  more  comprehensive,  for  example,  and spread  to
collaborating  agencies). And  for  some  types  of sector-specific  institutional
reforms,  SALs  may be the  first  step  in a  more  sustained  process  in  which
sector  adjustment  loans  follow  upon  activities  initiated  under  a SAL (e.g.,
agriculture  in  Kenya  and  industry  in  Ghana.) In addition,  there  are  numerous
examples  of cross-sectoral  adjustment  programs  of  which  the  SAL is  only  one
element.
Finally,  serial  SALs not  only  provide  a sustained  infusion  of resources
to  bolster  policy  reform,  they  may also  furnish  an  ongoing  context  for  policy
dialogue. This,  in the  view  of some  Bank  staff,  may  be the  most important
contribution  Qf structural  adjustment  lending  to development.  In addition,  an
ongoing  SAL  lending  program  may encourage  the  establishment  of a stable
technocratic  cadre  in  government,  an independent  policy  elite  with the
capacity  to  critique  Bank  reform  proposals  and  to  produce  its  own  reform
program  strategies.  This  was reportedly  the  result  of successive  SALs  in
Turkey,  Thailand,  and,  to some  extent,  in  the  Cote  d'Ivoire.
B.  TECHNICAL  ASSISTANCE
The  crucial  importance  of technical  assistance  to  carrying  out  reforms
in the  short  term  and  to sustaining  them  in  the  longer  run  was repeatedly
stressed  by Bank  staff. Technical  assistance  in support  of the  institutional.
aspects  of SALs  has  evolved  over  the  history  of structural  adjustment  lending
in the  Bank.  Early  SALs  tended  to  use  TALs  somewhat  as relatively  unspecified
'slush  funds. dipping  into  them  as  needed. This  provided  flexible
institutional  resources  for  SAL  requirements,  but it  did  not ensure  focused,
continuous,  tightly  designed  support  for  key SAL  activities.
Increasingly,  however,  the  longer  term  institutional  issues  in
structural  adjustment  are  being  addressed  through  companion  technical
assistance  loans,  carefully  crafted  to  provide  more  direct  institutional
support  for  SAL  measures. These  companion  TALs  are  most  prominent  in  Africa  -
- especially among the more recent loans --  where overall capacity of most
institutions  is  weakest. TALs  designed  in  conjunction  with SALs  keep
institutional  concerns  on the  agenda  in  a  way that  previous  ad  hoc technical
assistance  did  not.  But  TALs  accompanying  SALs  are  not  in the  driver's  seat;
their  design  often  suffers  as a result  of the  sometimes  break-neck  speed
applied  in  taking  a SAL  to the  Board. Often  they  are  under-prepared  --  both
in terms  of the  prior  sector  work  necessary  to ensure  good  design  and  of the
time  required  to allow  full  participation  and  internalization  by governments.
In  Africa,  there  is an  enduring  lament  that  technical  assistance  means
expatriates  who, despite  statements  to  the  contrary,  provide  little  training
for  nationals. In the  case  of Togo,  for  example,  the  technical  assintance  for
SALs  I  and II  was all  foreign,  with little  internalization  of results. Bank
staff  complained  that  although  the  Togolese  complied  to the  letter  with  most- 19  -
of the  requirementr  of SAL  I,  country  officials  lacked  real  understanding  of
the  meanin8  of the  adjustment  process. Instead,  their  compliance  was
motivated  by fiscal  desperation  and  by  what  one  Bank  economist  saw  as an
apparent  desire  to  belong  to the  'SAL  club,'  membership  in  which  was becoming
a sine  qua  non  of successful  development.
The tendency  to rely  heavily  on foreign  technical  assistance  for  SAL
implementation  is  a common  Bank  response  to the  urgent  need to  carry  out
critical  SAL  activities  in  a timely  manner. It is  also  a reflection  of the
inclination  of  countries  and  the  Bank  to concentrate  on discrete  and  formal
aspects  of institutional  change. As Lamb  pointed  out in  his  earlier  review,
'since  SALs  are  short  and  bureaucratic  life  is long  --  and  since  in any  case
attention  is often  quite  properly  focused  on  near-term  policy  changes  --  there
may  be implicit  incent$ves  for  governments  to substitutp  formal  compliance  for
substantive  change.'  41
C.  INSTITUTIONALIZATION  OF REFORMS
The  degree  to  which  public  sector  management  reforms  can  be  stitained
over  time  is  also  an  important  issue.  In  many  cases  it  is  far  too  early  to
determine  if  institutional  changes  are  taking  hold,  but  there  is,  nonetheless,
reason  for  concern. Some  institutional  improvements  appear  to  have  been
implemented  but  then  unravel  or are  eventually  reversed. Rationalization  of
the  public  investment  programming  process  over  the  first  several  Turkish  SALs,
for  example,  resulted  in a significant  reduction  in the  number  of investment
projects. As noted  earlier,  however,  the  trend  seems  recently  to have  turned
around.
In  a  number  of  SALs institutional  solutions  have  involved  setting  up
committees  and  working  groups,  with  varying  degrees  of ad  hoc-ness,  to  deal
with assorted  aspects  of SAL  oversight  and  economic  and  financial  policy
management  in general. In a  number  of cases  (e.g..  the  Comites  de Suivi  et
Reflexion  in the  Cote  d'Ivoire),  such  bodies  have  been  assembled  and then
dissolved  --  often  shortly  after  tranche  release  --  or they  may  only  be
officially  constituted  to show  formal  compliance  but  never  actually  meet..
When  such  bodies  do acquire  a life  of their  own,  they  offer  the  possibility,
suggested  earlier,  of generating  a thoughtful,  national  counterpart  with  whom
the  Bank  can  maintain  policy  dialogue,  ideally  leading  to some  internalization
of the  reform  process. This  appears  to have  occurred  in Thailand  with the
creation  of the  Thai  Development  Research  Institute  and  the  National  Economic
Social  Development  Board. But  there  is  also  the  danger  that  such  groups  may
become  policy  enclaves  --  further  debilitating  traditional  bureaucratic  organs
--  or that  they  may  contribute  to  already  rampant  institutional  proliferation
and fragmentation.
Other  examples  of slippage  of institutiqnal  reform  are  found  in the  area
of  government  employment  reforms,  where  cadres  are  reduced  under  pressure  but
4/  Lamb,  1984- 20  -
then  civll  service  recruitment  is  resumed  --  as  * function  of  all  the
contextual  forcei  that  made  it  rise  in  the  first  place.  (This  seems  to  have
occurred  in  Jamaica  and  Ghana.) The  one  possible  consolation  with regard  to
the slippage  of reform is  that  institutional  change  should  not  be regarded  as
linear  or  monotonic. Expectations  that  fail  to  allow  for  some  backsliding  are
probably unrealistic.
D.  GOVERNMENT  COMMITHENT  TO REFORMS
The  degree  to  which  reforms  may  be  sustained  over  time  is  related  to  the
question  of government  commitment  to change. The  need for  governments  to  make
and  sustain  commltments  to the  reform  process  and  the  conditions  under  which
this  commitment  takes  place  have  been  considered  extensively  in reviews  of the
adjustment  experience. Still,  several  findings  of this  review  may contribute
to the  ongoing  debate.
Staff  perceive  a correlation  between  government  comitment to
institutional  reform  and  the  overall  state  of the  economy. In some  cases,
improvements  in the  economy  reinforced  government  commitment  to reform,  as the
fruits  of  past labor  could  increasingly  be demonstrated  to  constituents.
(Turkey  and  Jamaica  are  examples.) In  other  countries  'adjustment  fatigue'
set  in,  and  economic  improvements  --  even  when linked  conspicuously  to
structural  adjustment  programs  --  tended  to defuse  government  fervor  for
change. As the  objective  need  to impose  reform  at all  costs  relaxed,
political  leaders  were  more inclined  to  heed  discontent  among  supporters  and
take  more seriously  the  organized  opposition  to unpopular  policy  measures.
(Kenya  and  perhaps  Ghana  during  some  periods  could  fit  this  explanation.)
Thus  governments  appear  to commit  to  or 'buy'  institutional  reforms
under  varying  circumstances.  First,  governments  often  'agree'  to reforms
contained  in  SALs  if they  represent  measures  already  initiated  or even  carried
out  by the  country  itself. In  this  case,  SAL  provisions  simply  reward  actions
already  taken. Second,  governments  may  have  decided  on their  own to  undertake
reforms  with  which  the  Bank  is in  agreement. Under  these  circumstances,  the
country's  *internalization'  of  reform  measures  proposed  by  the  Bank is
something  of a fiction.  Third,  the  greater  the  economic  need  and the  more  dire
the  state  of the  economy  as a  whole,  the  greater  the  government's  'commitments
to  reform.  (Most  of  Sub-Saharan  Africa  Conforms  to  this  pattern,  including
Togo,  Ghana,  and  the  Gambia.)  Fourth,  as  is  widely  acknowledged,  countries
which  internalize  the  rationale  for  reforms  or come  to own  them,  usually  after
sustained  dialogue  with Bank  staff,  demonstrate  a hig4er  commitment  to seeing
them  through. (This  may  have  occurred  in Turkey,  Thailrnd  and  more recently
in  Ghana  for  some  issues.)
E.  DESIGN  ISSUES
The  degree  to  which  governments  commit  to reforms,  and  the  extent  to
which  reform  programs  can  be sustained  over  time,  are  obviously  affected  by-21-
the  way in  which  SALs are  designed  and  by  the  Bank's  own  role  in
implementation.  Several  issues  are  important.
The  way in  which  SAL  conditionality  for  public  sector  management  reform
is designed  and  implemnted  may affect  the  institutionalization  of the  reform
program.  A iignificant  point  of discussion  among  those  Bank  staff  involved  in
SAL  design  was the  use  of tranches  in  promoting  compliance  wit:h  institutional
conditions  in  adjustment.  Many staff  believed  that  tranching  provided  only
limited  leverage  in  enforcing  conditionality.  S'nce  tranche  release  appears
to  have  occurred  in  the  overwhelming  majority  of  SAL operations,  the  Bank's
real  objective  in  tranching  SALs therefore  requires  clarification.  Some staff
maintained  that,  in  light  of  virtually  automatic  tranche  release,
conditionality  would  be better  linked  to loan  effectiveness.  And indeed,
proponents  of such 'front-loaded"  conditionality  --  which  appears  to  be
increasingly  common  in  adjustment  lending  --  maintain  that  at  least  it  ensures
compliance  on  a  few  important  issues  though  it  may  not  be  as  comprehensive  an
approach  as a loan  tranched  over  a longer  peried. Indeed,  some  countries,
such  as  Thailand,  have themselves  objected  on  principle  to the  use  of
tranches. It  may  be argued,  on the  other  hand,  that  although  tranches  may or
may  not  be a useful  mechanism  to enforce  SAL  conditionality,  their  utilization
may serve  a  worthwhile  institutional  purpose  --  to  prolong  the  period  of
policy  dialogue  --  as  effective  a  feature  in  some  instances  of SALs  as the
transfer  of resources. In addition,  tranching,  according  to some  Bank  staff,
also  provides  a convenient  mechanism  for  monitoring  'fuzzy'  institutional
components.
The  weak  monitoring  and  supervision  of SALs  was  another  design  concern
frequently  raised  by Bank  staf'- Institutional  components  of SALs  have  not
been  well  monitored,  partly  because  the  activities  that  comprise  them  are  not
always  specified  in  step-by-step  action  plans. This  sometimes  makes  it
difficult  as  well for  countries  to  know  what steps  are  necessary  to carry  out
obligations  or to  know  how to get  from  point  A  to B.  And,  as has  been
repeatedly  underlined,  supervision  of institutional  components.  (often  accorded
A  low  priority  in  relation  to  other  SAL  elements)  has  been spotty,  haphazard
and  indifferent. Indeed  SAL  supervision  reports  written  by Bank  staff
uniformly  contain  only  fleeting  references  to  institutional  components,  and
implementation  difficulties  that  arise  are  discussed  so superficially  that  it
is  often  impossible  for  the  unfamiliar  reader  to grasp  the  nature  of the
problem.
It  has frequently  been  asserted  about  adjustment  lending  in  general  that
the  number  of conditions  contained  in  most SALs  is  excessive. (For  example,
the  Cote  d'Ivoire's  SAL  III  included  80 conditions.)  This  burden  takes  on
institutional  dimensions  to the  extent  that  already  weak  managerial  capacity
becomes  strained,  and  effective  implementation  and  adequate  monitoring  by the
Bank  is  made  virtually  impossible.  As a result,  an informal  process  of
priority-setting  takes  place. Thus,  enforcement  is sought  for  those  selected
conditions  explicitly  linked  to tranche  release,  whereas  a  more lenient
position  is assumed  for  other  conditions.  A more realistic  design  would  limit
conditions  to those  few  which  could  be reasonably  enforced  by Bank  and
country.- 22  -
The  number  of conditions  is  one  reflection  of the  degree  of complexity
in SAL  design. The  other  persistent  question  is related  to the  number  of
institutional  components  which  may  be coherently  combined  to form  a SAL
institutional  package. The  much  discussed  Ochristmas  tree^  problem  still
constrains  effective  Implementation  of  many SAL  institutional  programs  and
exacerbates  the  strain  on already  weak  monitoring  capacity.
:ne  nature  of conditionality  attached  to institutional  components
contained  in  SALs  varies  significantly  from  one loan  or country  to another  and
oveor  time. Many early  SALs  (and,  later,  the  first  group  of  SALs in  Sub-
Saharan  Africa)  tended  to  have *soft'  conditionality  tied  to the  execution  of
studies. Some  staff  believed  that  studies  were  an inappropriate  subject  for
Bank  conditionality.  But  for  many  African  countries  the  deficit  of adequate,
reliable  information  to feed  into  the  policy  process  wAs in itself  a  key
developmental  constraint,  making  the  financing  of studies  reasonable.  Whether
SALs  should  have  been  the  lending  mechanism,  however,  needs  to be assessed.
A  final  point  concerns  analytic  and  sector  work  on  basic  political  and
administrative  issues. Where  SALs have  foundered,  some  of the  root  causes
have  obviously  been  political  or 'bureaucratic-political'  in  the  Allisonian
sense. 5 1  (SAL  1I in  Panama,.  SAL  II in  Kenya,  and  SAL  I in  Senegal  are  cases
in  point.)  Preparatory  CESW  --  emphasizing  analysis  of political-economy
issues  and,  more  simply,  just  laying  out  the  public  administrative  landscape
for  policy  reform  --  is still  uncommon  in the  Bank,  although  there  are  notable
exceptions,  such  as Mauritania  and  Thailand. It is  also  worth  pointing  out
that  even  with this  basic  groundwosc,  unpredictable  institutional  or political
shifts  (e.g.  ministerial  changes  or  electoral  transitions)  may derail
institutional  reform. Moreover,  the  degree  to  which  Bank staff  are informed
about  and  able  to  analyze  these  changes  is  too  limited. This  may be an area
Where  resident  missions  need  an enhanced  role,  or  where institutionalized,
systematic  briefings  by out-of-Bank  country  experts  might  become  standard  Bank
policy.
IV.  CONCLUSIONS
The  enormously  wide range  of  public  sector  management  components  in
structural  adjustment  and  technical  assistance  loans  since  1979  poses  daunting
obstacles  to an  assessment  of their  record. The  findings  of this  review  do
not form  the  basis  for  definitive  judgments,  but  they  do suggest  the  following
tentative  conclusions:
5/  See,  Graham  Allison,  The  Essence  of  Decision:  Explaining  the  Cuban  Missile
Crisis,  (Boston:  Little,  Brown,  1971).  Allison  portrays  the  policy  process
as one  in which the  major  actors  are  bureaucrats  whose  predominant
political  instinct  is to defend  the interests  of their agencies  qua
agencies.- 23  -
o  Public  sector  management  components  of SALs progressed  unevenly,
and  outcomes  varied  vith diverse  political,  administrative,  and
economic  conditions. In  general,  SALs  did  not  prescribe  uniform
solutions  to institutional  problems. Depending  on the
circumstances,  SALs  at times  fostered  the  creation  of new
institutions  or the  reorgan4zation  or sometimes  the  elimination  of
old  ones. They  often  called  for  the  streamlining  and
rationalization  of procedures  and  commonly  introduced  new
management  systems  and  mechanisms.  Many SALs  sought  improved
coordination  among  agencies  charged  with carrying  out reforms.
For  the  most  part,  where  such  prescriptions  did  effect  successful
institutional  change, however,  it  was often  incremental  and  not
necessarily  sustainable  in the  absence  of Bank  support.
O  Despite  the  heterogeneity  of institutional  responses  described
above,  a large  number  of SALs  did  promote  the  establishment  of new
institutions  --  either  with long-  or short-term  mandates,  even
when bureaucratic  rationalization  and  streamlining  were  being
prescribed  as desirable  policy  goals. Although  evidence  about  the
impact  of these  institutions  is  not  readily  available  in  most
cases,  the  dangers  of institutional  proliferation  raise  concerns
about  the  advisability  of this  practice. Moreover,  as  perceptions
of the  proper  role  of the  state  in  the  economy  change  in  many
developing  countries,  a crucial  adjustment  task  may increasingly
become  the  dismantling  rather  than  the  creation  of institutions.
O  Those  public  sector  management  reforms  for  which  routinized
methodologies  and  systems  are  introduced  are  more likely  to  be
sustained  over  time  than  those  for  which  no clear  set  of
procedures  was put  in  place. Public  sector  management  reforms
that  from  the  outset  can  be linked  to  actionable  steps  agreed  upon
by Bank  and  borrower  stand  a better  chance  of being  successfully
implemented.
o  Calculations  made by  Bank staff  about  appropriate  time  allocations
for  public  sector  management  reforms  were almost  always  in  error.
The  timing  requirements  of SALs  impose  serious,  sometimes  fatal,
constraints  on the  effectiveness  of public  sector  management
reforms,  although  the  catalytic  benefits  of SALs  can  often  he
significant.
O  Public  management  reforms  promoted  through  SALs  are  more
successful  when supported  by specific  technical  assistance
projects. Without  targeted  institutional  support,  reforms  are
more likely  to  end  as one-shot  events  subject  to reversal  or
slippage.
o  Targeted  technical  assistance  directly  linked  to SAL  public  sector
management  components  work  better  than  loosely  structured,
conventional  technical  assistance  projects  in supporting
institutional  reforms  in SALs.  But,  in general,  technical_ 24  -
assistance  has  been sloppily  delivered,  expatriate-dominated,  and
often  only  minimally  effective. Evldence  of real  transfer  of
skills  and  institutional  capacity  through  technical  assistance  is
not abundant. Nonetheless,  SALs  should  be accompanied  by tightly
designed  companion  TALs  to support  implementation  of public  sector
management  reform  components.  These  companion  TALs  may, at some
later  point,  be succeeded  by freestanding  projects  that  may  or  may
not  be  directly  linked  to  policy  reforms  in  SALS,  however,  as  new
areas  of  institutional  reform  are  identified.  Real  progress  on
the  institutional  front  may well  depend,  however,  on  the
development  of  new lending  instruments  which  are  more  suited  to
the  time  requirements  of institutional  reform  than  SALs,  but  do
not  have  the  enervating  effect  on  borrowers  of most traditional
technical  assistance.
O  One  new  instrument  might  take  the  form  of  a  policy-based  type
sector  adjustment  loan  specifically  designed  to  address  public
sector  management  issues. Such  an operation  might  contain
conditionality  for  institutional  reforms,  but  would  be prepared
independently  of and  perhaps  on a slower  track  than  a conventional
structural  adjustment  loan,  (although  it  would  be closely
coordinated  with overall  country  strategy  objectives,  as  would  any
SECAL). A public  sector  adjustment  loan  might  also  adopt  a longer
time  horizon  by several  years  than  do SALs  at present  to  complete
project  activities.  Ideally,  it  would  not focus  exclusively  on
policy  reforms,  but  would  also  involve  medium-term  efforts  to
improve  the  management  of  key  public  sector  institutions  through
training,  technical  assistance  andlor  investment  programs.
o  Implementation  of  public  sector  management  reforms  in  SALs receive
scant  attention,  either  through  monitoring,  supervision  or
evaluation.  When such  assessments  do take  place,  the  analysis
rarely  goes  beyond  the  finding  that  progress  was either
satisfactory  or  unsatisfactory.  As a  result,  documentation  about
what  worked,  what failed,  and  why these  results  occurred  is almost
non-existent.  The  Bank's  own  internal  system  for  keeping  such
reforms  on track  needs  to be revised  and  more stringent
information  requirements  should  be imposed  on supervisory  and
evaluative  staff. The  current  system  for  monitoring  the
implementation  of institutional  components  could  be improved
through  the  introduction  of real  bureaucratic  incentives  for
.competent  supervision.  This  might  involve  subjecting  supervision
reports  to  more  public  scrutiny  within  the  Bank,  and  tightening  up
the  analytic  reporting  framework  so that  key issues  pertaining  to
the  execution  of public  management  reforms  must be addressed
routinely  and systematically.  In the  same  way that  adherence  to
disbursement  schedules  is taken  as an indicator  of progress  in the
physical  and  financial  implementation  of  projects,  a clearer
notion  of  where institutional  components  should  be at each stage
of SAL  implementation  should  be developed,  programmed  and
monitored. Mid-term  assessments  of institutional  elements  in  SALs-25-
might  be carried  out  by disinterested  evaluators  with appropriate
ezpertise  within  the  Bank  to  head  off institutional  disasters
during  the  life  of the  loan. Investigation  of the  application  of
such  evaluation  system.  by other  donors  such  as USAID  and  the  UNDP
mighpt  be a useful  starting  point.
O  Preparatory  country  economic  and  sector  work  is  crucial  to  public
sector  management  reforms  undertaken  through  SALs  Such  analyses
can  probe  institutional  issues  that  may  be  the  focus  of  future
reforms,  identify  actors  and  institutions  that  are  critical  to  the
reform  process,  or,  at  the  very  least,  explain  how  relevant
aspeots  of  the  administrative  and  political  systems  work.  Sector
work  may  be  undertaken  independently  or  may  be  embodied  in studies
prepared  as  part  of  SALs,  providing  analysis  for  institutional
components  in succeeding  SALs.  At present,  there  are  nio
systematic  requirements  that  such  preparatory  country  economic  and
.sector  work  be  performed,  and  no  clear  quality  standards  have  been
established  for  this  type  of  analysis.  Indeed,  this  work  is
largely  carried  out  at  the  discretion  of individual  country
divisions.  Such  analysis  should  become  a routine,  obligatory
task  in the  preparation  of any  public  sector  management  program
undertaken  in  the  context  of structural  adjustment.- 26  -
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olivia  SAL I  Is"  06/05/60  SO.0O
bujuid  SAL  I  1m  05s/22/86  1.00
SAL  It  1919  06/14/88  90.00
Efcnmic  P.S. MgM.  TAL  179  OS/14/87  ?.so
NWirga  Ar.  TAL  18,7  12/10/8?  10.00
C.A.A.  SAL  I  13  09/09/8  14.00
SAL  It  1916  06/09/'  40.00
TAL  11  1581  04/16/8  8.00
Chil  SAL  I  26  lolm22/s  250.00
SAL II  2767  11/20/86  250.00
SAL  11  2892  12/15/6?  250.00
TAL 1  2504  03/14/U  11.00
Congo  SAL  I  286  or/21/8?  70.00
tAL  1  22am  05S19/85  11.00
rAL  11  2m  09/16O86  4.00
P.1.  Intt.  Owt.  7AL,  286  07/21/8?  13.20
Costs  Mfca  SAL  1  2518  04/16/85  80.00
TAL  1  2519  04/16/85  3.50
Expot  Oewt. TAL  2m  2  5osios/  25.20
Coto dIvsire  SAL  I  2018  11/24/81  SO.00
SAL  11  2m2  07/05/5  250.70
SAL.-I  2711  06/03/86  250.00
TAL  1  205  11/24/81  16.00
Daoinica  SAL  I  l81r  06/09/4?  3.00
Gabon  SAL  1  293  04/21/8  50.00
Oebi  - SAL  I  1730  08/26/86  5.00
Ohaw  SAL I  1Fm  04/14/87  34.00
Accra OiStr.  Rabab.  tAIL  154  03/21/81  22.00
Export Rehab. TAIL  1436  01/03104  17.10
hnstt.  Suppwt TAL  1770  04/14/87  10.80
Guine  SAL 1  1659  02/11/86  25.00
SAL It  1926  06/16/88  65.00
Econe  mic ast.  TAL  1  1559  03/14/5  9.50
Powr  II  Ins.  & TAL  1595  05/1685  8.00
Guina  Issu  SAL  I  17Y6  05/21/8?  10.00
TAL  I  15r1  09/11/64  6.00
Guyun  SAL  t  1096  02/03/81  22.00
T?L It  1949  02/03/81  1.50
Jmica  SAL  1  2105  03/23/182  76.20
SAL It  2315  06/14/85  60.20
SAL  III  2476  11/20/84  55.00
TAL 1  2104  03/23/2  6.10
TAL  II  250I  03/19/0  9.00
Water Suply  & Sur. tAL  2412  05/22/64  9.00
PA* AdL Eeotr  TAL  2423  05/22/4  4.50
Kama  SAL  I  o099  03/25/80  SS.00
SAL  I1  2t90  07101/82  130.90
Expowt  PromotIon T*AL  l145  06/12/0  4.SO
Ar.  TAL  1  r  07/01/12  6.00
Kore  SAL  I  20?  12/17t/61  250.00
SAL It  2a  11/08/85  300.00
alawi  WSAL  I  2028  06/25/81  '5.00
SAL 11  142?  12/20/85  5S.00
SAL 11  161  12/19/81  30.00
TAL 11  1418  12/20/85  1.50
"owl  tonfc  SAL  I  1812  06/02/6?  1S.00
P.E.  Rehab.  TAL  56  03/26/  16.40
Inetl.  , Artisuet  Govt.  TAL  1  03/26/5  S.25- 27  -
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LN/C3t  BOARD  NC
COUNTRY  PROJECT  NluI  APPROAL  AMOUNT
(USIA)
........................ "t......................................0,....................'/B'l..............is...  0..... Nagritiu  SAL  I  W010  06/02/61  15.00
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